We examine how firms' capital structure choices vary with the presence of dual-class ownership. We document that, as compared to a propensity-matched sample of single-class firms, dual-class firms have higher leverage, greater propensity to issue private debt, greater reliance on relationship lending, more frequent use of negative and financial covenants, and more frequent use of performance pricing provisions in private debt contracts. This evidence is consistent with controlling insiders bonding against the agency problems associated with dual-class ownership through their capital structure choices. In further corroboration of this theory, we document that leverage attenuates (and ultimately reverses) the adverse effect of dual-class status on Tobin's q. Taken together, our evidence suggests that debt plays a governance role and disciplines insiders in dual-class firms.
Introduction
Dual class ownership structures allow a few shareholders -primarily insiders, i.e., managers or directors -to control a portion of the votes that substantially exceeds their rights to the firm's cash flows.
Several studies have documented that this disparity between cash flow rights and voting rights is associated with expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling insiders (e.g., Bebchuk et al.
[2000]; Johnson et al. [2000] ; Yermack [2006] ). In a recent paper, Gompers et al. [2009] provide empirical evidence that dual class ownership structures are associated with increased agency costs and reduced firm values using a comprehensive list of dual-class firms in the U.S. While this finding adds to the accumulating empirical evidence that controlling minority shareholder structures are negatively associated with firm value, it begs the question of why such ownership structures are developed and maintained.
The objective of this study is to shed light on the existence and performance implications of dual class ownership structures in the United States.
1 Specifically, given that bank monitoring can exert a governance role and disciplines insiders in dual-class firms, we conjecture that dual class firms employ debt as a bonding mechanism to alleviate the agency conflicts. The agency problems inherent in dualclass ownership and the absence of traditional governance and monitoring structures (such as proxy contests, the takeover threats, and even an independent board of directors in some cases) suggest that outside investors will price protect or stay away from investing in the shares of these firms. To the extent that controlling insiders in dual-class firms care about their firm's value and access to capital markets, they are likely to employ bonding mechanisms that help alleviate these agency conflicts and act as a commitment to refrain from value-expropriating actions (e.g., empire building).
The disciplining role of debt is well documented in the literature. Debt can constrain managers from pursuing personal objectives such as perquisite consumption or empire building (Jensen [1986] ;
1 Recent studies document that about six percent of publicly traded firms in the United States have more than one class of shares. Gompers et al. [2009] document that over the period 1995 -2002 , six percent of their sample firms have more than one class of common stock. Amit and Villalonga [2008] find that over the period 1994-2000, twelve percent of their sample of 515 Fortune 500 firms have more than one class of common stock. Stulz [1990] ; Grossman and Hart [1982] ; Hart and Moore [1995] ), and force managers to liquidate inefficient operations because default allows creditors to force the firm into costly bankruptcy or liquidation (Harris and Raviv [1990] ). Therefore, we argue that dual class firms use debt as a commitment mechanism to minimize the agency costs, which we refer to as the bonding hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, we expect dual-class firms to use on average significantly more debt as compared to a matched sample of single-class firms. 2 We also expect dual-class firms to rely more on private debt because private lenders have access to internal information and are effective monitors who exercise significant control over underperforming companies.
We further study specific monitoring mechanisms through which insiders in dual-class firms bond with outside shareholders using bank loan level data. Specifically, we examine differences in bankborrower relationship and contractual features of bank loans between dual-class and single-class firms.
First, we expect dual-class firms to develop longer-term lending relationships as a way to minimize the potential for agency problems. The strength of a bank-borrower relationship signals the banks' confidence in the borrower firms, and banks are likely more involved in borrower firm governance over the course of the lending relationship. Second, we expect dual-class firms to commit to bank monitoring by using more negative and performance-based financial covenants in their debt contracts. Recent research suggests that private lenders play an important monitoring role through numerous loan covenants, which constrain managerial agency costs and act as tripwires that signal the need for lender intervention (e.g., Dichev and Skinner [2002] ; Roberts and Sufi [2009a] ). In addition, performance-based covenants in conjunction with negative covenants are often used in situations where conflicts of interest are more severe (Christensen and Nikolaev [2010] ). Third, we expect dual-class firms to commit to more bank scrutiny by contracting on loan credit agreements that contain more performance pricing provisions. Performance pricing helps to control moral hazard and adverse selection problems (Asquith et al. [2005] ) and increases lenders'
2 An alternative explanation for insiders to take on more leverage is that more debt helps them inflate the voting power of their equity stakes and thereby reduce the possibility of takeover attempts (Harris and Raviv [1988] ; Stulz [1988] ). However, given that dual-class firms are virtually immune to hostile takeovers, firm managers are unlikely to over-lever for these reasons (Gompers et al. [2009] ).
bargaining power to renegotiate the contract following a period of poor performance. Hence it helps lenders in exercising control over managerial decision-making (Roberts and Sufi [2009b] ).
In our final set of tests, we revisit the findings of Gompers et al. [2009] and examine whether leverage affects the documented negative association between firm value, as measured by Tobin's q, and the dual-class structure. If debt helps insiders in dual-class firms bond against rent-seeking behavior, then dual-class ownership together with higher leverage should increase a firm's value (provided that concentrated control is beneficial for these firms after controlling for incentive problems).
To test the above hypotheses, we employ a sample of dual-class firms constructed by Gompers et al. [2009] for the period 1995 through 2002. It is important to clarify that we do not study whether exogenously assigning a dual-class structure to a randomly selected firm is beneficial to shareholders, which seems unlikely given the agency problems discussed earlier. We acknowledge that dual-class structure is an endogenous choice arising from the need for greater control by management or founders (DeAngelo and DeAngelo [1985] ) or other efficiency considerations. 3 As a result, there is a fundamental difficulty of directly examining the relation between firm value and disproportional control structures.
One advantage of our setting is that at the time of signing a debt contract, the dual class ownership is predetermined as it is not a part of the negotiation process. Hence, endogeneity of dual class structures to the choice of debt contracting mechanisms is unlikely to be severe. We recognize, however, that differences exist between the contracting environments of dual-class and single-class firms, and that these differences are likely to affect the contracting decisions made by insiders in these firms. To control for these differences, we employ a propensity score matching design to pair dual-class and single-class firms along a number of firm-specific dimensions documented by prior work as determinants of a dual-class ownership structure. This method is considered to be more robust to potential misspecification when the research design assumes an incorrect functional form for the relation between controls and outcomes (Bharath et al. [2009] ; Armstrong et al. [2010] ). 4 Overall, our evidence on various capital structure decisions supports the bonding hypothesis, suggesting that insiders in dual-class firms use debt as a bonding mechanism to commit against expropriation or other value-destroying actions. We highlight the following main empirical findings.
First, in comparison to a matched sample of single-class firms, dual-class firms are associated with higher leverage. Second, compared to the matched sample of single-class firms, dual-class firms have a greater tendency to issue private loans, are more likely to borrow from relationship lenders, rely more extensively on negative and financial covenants, and are more likely to have loan credit agreements with performance pricing provisions. Finally, we find that the negative relation between dual-class ownership and Tobin's q is attenuated by the effect of leverage. This result is interesting given that on average dual-class firms have lower Tobin's q (Gompers et al. [2009] ).
We contribute to the literature in the following three ways. First, we extend the literature on dual-class ownership structures by identifying debt to be an alternative governance mechanism in dualclass firms. The bulk of the research in this area focuses on determining whether such structures destroy value. Such an enquiry is difficult, however, given that these structures arise in equilibrium.
Acknowledging this limitation, we investigate the use of an alternative governance mechanism (specifically, debt and accounting-based information in debt contracts) that controls for the agency problems inherent in dual-class firms. Understanding the use of such mechanisms is likely to shed light on the use of the dual-class ownership structure in the U.S. Armstrong et al. (2010) discuss the difficulties in identifying "good" and "bad" governance structures, and our empirical results are consistent with their conjecture that governance structure associated with the agency conflicts, such as those in dualclass firms, should not be viewed as unconditionally "bad" governance structure.
Second, while prior studies provide descriptive evidence that dual-class firms are more levered than single-class firms and conjecture debt to be a control mechanism in dual-class firms (Gompers et al. 4 We describe several other endogeneity checks. See section 5 for a detailed discussion.
[2009]; Moyer et al. [1992] ), we provide novel empirical evidence regarding the specific monitoring mechanisms through which insiders in dual-class firms bond with outside shareholders using syndicated loan data. Our empirical results suggest that banks play an active monitoring role in dual-class firms through long-term lending relationships and detailed loan covenants and contingency provisions in debt contracts.
Third, our research adds to the understanding of the use of accounting information in the contracting process of dual-class firms. Our results suggest that debt contracts of dual-class firms contain financial covenants and performance pricing provisions based on outputs of accounting systems. This highlights the role of accounting information in reducing agency costs in dual-class firms (Smith and Warner [1979] ).
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the related literature and our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, discusses our research method, and reports summary statistics. Section 4 describes our multiple regressions analyses and presents the results. Finally, section 5 addresses the endogeneity concern and section 6 concludes.
Background and Empirical Predictions
We begin by providing a brief overview of the related research on dual-class firms. We then develop our hypotheses. The interested reader may also refer to Adams and Ferreira [2007] for a comprehensive review of the empirical literature, and Burkart and Lee [2008] for a discussion of the theoretical literature on separation of ownership and control.
Background
Introducing a dual-class ownership structure is arguably the most straightforward way to depart from the "one share -one vote" principle (other ways to deviate from this principle include using differential voting rights, pyramidal structures, and crossholdings, as well as implicit mechanisms such as takeover defenses voting). Control in dual-class shares can come from two sources: voting control, where the holder of dual-class shares enjoys voting rights that exceed his cash flow rights, and board control, where the holder has the power to elect a majority of the board. Not surprisingly, dual-class structures are among the most widely researched control-enhancing mechanisms, and are often interpreted as a manifestation of the classic agency problem between owners and managers (Partch [1987] ; Jarrell and Poulsen [1988] Overall, the debate on the relation between dual-class ownership structures and firm value is still ongoing (Burkart and Lee [2008] ). 6 The lack of consensus may be due to the endogenous nature of ownership structures, as firms are likely to choose the structure that is optimal for their particular business environment, and there are potentially countervailing governance mechanisms in dual class firms to signal insiders' commitment to shareholder value maximization. For example, in the context of family firms, Ali et al. [2006] document that family firms recognize the inherent agency conflicts and respond by committing to a higher financial reporting quality. Wang [2006] finds that founding family ownership is associated with lower abnormal accruals, greater earnings informativeness, and less persistence of transitory loss components in earnings. However, there is some evidence to the contrary as well. 
Empirical Predictions: Capital Structure Decisions
Dual-class structures, in which insiders hold superior voting shares, can be optimal for some firms as managers can use control to make discretionary decisions that enhance firm value (e.g., Hart
[1995]; Burkart and Lee [2008] ). However, even if such ownership structures initially benefit the firm, deviations from "one share -one vote" may not be optimal under subsequent generations of management.
For example, succeeding management may be inclined to use their excess control to extract private 5 The authors also examine disproportional control through voting agreements and pyramids and find that while these mechanisms do not matter when control is measured as a wedge, they increase Tobin's q when control is measured as a ratio. 6 The lack of strong conclusions is also evident in studies that examine stock returns around announcements of dualclass recapitalizations and unifications (e.g., Cornett and Vetsuypens [1989] ; Jarrell and Poulson [1988] ; Dimitrov and Jain [2006] ). These studies show that both unifications and recapitalizations can create, rather than destroy, value for non-controlling shareholders. However, these findings are not surprising given the endogenous nature of these events (firms are likely to engage in unifications or recapitalizations only when these events are expected to increase firm value). 7 Francis et al. [2005] argue that controlling shareholders will obscure information to outside parties in order to extract more private benefits. In line with these predictions they find that dual class firms are associated with lower earnings informativeness.
benefits. 8 Jensen and Meckling [1976] argue that managers who realize the adverse effects of agency problems have incentives to bond against actions that decrease firm value. Such incentives can be present not only ex ante but also ex post, on a voluntary basis (Zwiebel [1996] ). Because insiders in dual-class firms are likely to recognize these inherent conflicts and their corresponding capital market consequences, they have incentives to adopt commitment mechanisms to not expropriate outside shareholders or undertake value-destroying actions.
We conjecture debt to be one such mechanism. Prior theoretical and empirical research establishes the role of debt in disciplining self-interested managers (insiders) (e.g., Jensen [1986] ; Grossman and Hart [1992] ; Harris and Raviv [1990] ; Zwiebel [1996] , among others). In particular, higher levels of debt are shown to increase the threat of both bankruptcy and loss of control and thus provide managers with incentives to exert effort. Consistent with these theoretical arguments, Berger et al. [1997] hypothesize that entrenched managers are likely to shy away from debt financing. They find that, indeed, a lack of incentives from either ownership or active monitoring is associated with lower levels of leverage. Jung et al. [1996] similarly conclude that managerial entrenchment leads firms to issue equity when issuing debt would be more beneficial to shareholders. Assuming that insiders with voting control rights determine financing policy, we expect them to commit to not expropriate non-controlling shareholders or undertake value-destroying actions by issuing debt. More formally:
H1: Dual-class firms employ higher levels of debt financing than single-class firms.
Next, we explore the details of dual class firms' debt financing decisions. In particular we expect the reliance on private debt to be more common among dual class firms, hence subjecting themselves to greater lender monitoring. Private lenders (banks) are considered effective monitors with significant informational advantages and through numerous contractual features of credit agreements (see Tung [2010] for more details). Despite debt-equity conflict, debtholder-shareholder interests may overlap in certain situations -for example, toward reducing managerial shirking, empire-building, and private benefit consumption. Indeed, the existing empirical studies provide evidence that banks' monitoring enhances shareholder value. Event studies documented positive abnormal stock returns of the borrower firm upon the public announcement of bank loans (James [1987] , Slovin et al. [1992] , Best and Zhang [1993] , among others). More recently, Shepherd et al. [2009] find that the presence of bank loans is positively associated with firm value, in particular when agency costs are high. Given potentially severe agency problems in dual class ownership, it is plausible that insiders of dual class firms choose to issue more private debt to improve shareholder value. More formally:
H2: Reliance on private debt is more common in dual-class firms than single-class firms.
We further examine the specific mechanisms through which insiders in dual class firms commit to increased monitoring. Specifically, we study differences in lender-borrower relationships and features of private debt contracts between dual class and single class firms. We argue that the strength of bankborrower relationship helps discipline the insiders. Due to information production advantage and repeated interaction with the borrower over time, banks are more actively involved in borrower firm governance over the course of the lending relationship (Gorton and Winton [2002] Nini et al. [2009a] for investment decisions, Roberts and Sufi [2009a] for financing decisions, Nini et al. [2009b] for corporate governance decisions).
Substantive differences exist, however, among different financial covenants. Christensen and Nikolaev [2010] argue that financial covenants control the underlying agency problems via two conceptually different mechanisms. Capital-based covenants (covenants formulated in terms of balance sheet information) are typically used to align the interests of lenders and shareholders ex ante. This provides shareholders with incentives to monitor the management and to maintain the focus on value maximization. In contrast, performance-based covenants (covenants formulated in terms of current performance and efficiency ratios) act as tripwires that detect deteriorations in current performance and hence limit agency problems via ex post reallocation of control to lenders. In the context of dual class firms, capital requirements are less likely to be an effective mechanism because shareholders cannot effectively discipline the entrenched management. In contrast, performance covenants impose greater control over the management and hence we expect the use of performance-based covenants to be more common. More formally:
H5: Credit agreements in dual-class firms are more likely to contain performance-based covenants but not capital-based covenants relative to those in single-class firms.
Besides covenants, there are explicit contingency provisions responding to the borrower's timechanging circumstances. In particular, performance pricing ties the interest rate to specific financial performance measures. This contract feature reduces moral hazard and adverse selection, and provides managers with the incentive to maintain high performance during the life of the loan (Asquith et al.
[2005]). Additionally, poor performance shifts the bargaining power to lenders in future renegotiations (Roberts and Sufi [2009b] ). Hence, in such renegotiations, lenders are in a better position to affect managerial decision-making. Given these considerations, we predict that insiders in dual class firms commit to more bank scrutiny by contracting on loan credit agreements that contain more performance pricing provisions.
Pricing grids are typically formulated in terms of accounting information and credit ratings (Asquith et al. [2005] ). Accounting based pricing grids can be further classified into profitability-based and capital-based grids. Profitability-based grids rely on financial performance indicators that reflect current period performance and thus are expected to be more timely in detecting early deteriorations in credit risk as compared to capital-based grids. In contrast, capital-based pricing grids provide stronger incentives to limit the amount of debt in the capital structure. Because limiting the amount of debt in firms capital structure is unlikely to be an effective way to provide insiders in dual class firms with incentives to perform, we expect greater reliance on profitability-based pricing grids in the credit agreements of dual-class firms. Also note that prior research documents that rating-based grids substitute for profitability-based grids but not capital-based grids (Ball et al. [2008] ; Christensen and Nikolaev [2010] ). Given this, we predict: 
Empirical Predictions: Tobin's Q
To the extent that debt financing acts as a bonding mechanism, we expect the capital market's assessment of dual-class ownership to vary with a firm's leverage. As an additional set of analyses, we consider the bonding effect of leverage in the context of the relation between dual class ownership and firm's value. Following prior studies, we re-visit the association between the presence of dual-class shares and Tobin's q, a proxy for firm value or asset productivity. The bulk of the literature uses this measure and generally finds evidence that, in the U.S., Tobin's q decreases with insider voting rights (Gompers et al. [2009] ). However, if some dual-class firms choose to employ higher levels of debt to bond against value-destroying actions, then, assuming that there are benefits associated with centralized control, these firms are likely to have higher valuations. Note that it is costly for other firms to mimic this strategy in an attempt to boost their valuations and thus partitioning on leverage should help separating companies based on their type. The costs of the additional monitoring and constraints of debt financing are likely to outweigh the private benefits enjoyed by entrenched managers. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H7: Leverage attenuates the negative association between dual-class ownership and Tobin's q.
Data, Descriptive Statistics and Research Method

Data and Descriptive Statistics
We begin with a comprehensive dual-class dataset covering the period 1995 through 2002 built and generously provided by Gompers et al. [2009] . The most common dual-class structure is the 10:1 structure, whereby the superior class has ten votes per share and the inferior class has one vote per share.
Gompers et al. [2009] find that, on average, the insiders of dual-class firms own a majority of voting rights (about 60 percent) but a minority of cash flow rights (about 40 percent). Nearly all of these voting rights come from superior voting stock; inferior voting stock provides less than 15 percent of insiders' voting rights. More details on the sample and its construction are available in Gompers et al. [2009] .
The rest of our data come from several sources. firm-year observations. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our sample firms. Panel A provides these statistics for the full sample of single-and dual-class firms, while panel B compares dual-class firms with the sample of single-class firms. We present the mean and median of firm characteristics across the two samples, and test for differences between single-and dual-class firms. About 5% of firms in the sample have a dualclass structure. The dual-class firms are significantly different from the single-class firms in several aspects. Compared to single-class firms, dual-class firms are larger, have fewer growth opportunities (only the mean difference is significant), distribute lesser dividends, and are less profitable. Dual-class firms also have more tangible assets, spend more on advertising, less on research and development, have lower betas, are less volatile and less risky. Finally, as expected, the dual-class sample has more family firms and has a greater proportion of firms in the media industry.
Research Method
As evident from the descriptive statistics, dual-class firms are significantly different from singleclass firms. The decision to have a dual-class structure as well as to rely on debt financing is determined by the firm, and is likely to be related to firm characteristics and the investment opportunities set (Demsetz and Lehn [1985] ; Himmelberg et al. [1999] ). Ideally, we want to compare pairs of matched firms with identical determinants of the outcome variable (e.g., leverage) except for their dual class status.
Once the elements of the firms' contracting environment have been isolated, the observed differences in capital structure choices can be used to estimate of the effect of dual-class status on leverage and characteristics of debt contracts. To obtain such estimates, we employ the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) technique described in Heckman et al. [1997, 1998] 
We develop the above model to incorporate variables in the contracting environment of firms that are likely to impact capital structure choices (Berger et al. [1997] ; Frank and Goyal [1995] ). Each of the above variables is described in detail in the Appendix. The dependent variable is DUAL, which is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm has a dual-class ownership structure and 0 otherwise. We further include industry dummies and year dummies in the above model. For each firm-year, we estimate the predicted probability (i.e., propensity score) of it being a dual-class firm. We then match each dualclass firm-year with a set of single-class firm-year observations and use the Nearest Neighbor estimator (Heckman et al. [1997 (Heckman et al. [ , 1998 ). The Nearest Neighbor estimator chooses for each dual-class firm-year, the n single-class firm-year observations with closest propensity scores and uses the arithmetic average of the debt characteristics of the n single-class firm-years (we use n = 30 in the reported results; our results are robust to using n = 10 and n = 50 as in Bharath et al. [2009] ).
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Panel A of Table 2 presents the results of the propensity score regression. Our results indicate that the probability of a dual-class ownership structure is greater in larger firms, older firms, firms with fewer operating segments, firms with lower growth opportunities, family firms, and firms in the media industry.
We also find that dual-class structures are more likely in firms with lower return volatility and lower betas. In addition, we observe that dual-class structures exhibit a positive association with the proportion of tangible assets and advertising expenditures, as well as a negative association with research and development expenditures.
We further verify the absence of covariate imbalance by testing for significant differences between treatment and control group on the matching dimensions. Panel B of Table 2 presents the comparisons of the average values of firm characteristics between the dual-class firms and the matched single-class class firms, as well as the t-tests of the differences in means. We find that none of the variables are significantly different between the matched single-class and dual-class firms. The analysis indicates that the matching algorithm was successful in achieving a balanced control group, and differences in these observed variables across the treatment and control samples are not likely to confound our estimates of the average treatment effect. We present our results on the relation between dual-class structures and capital structure choices in the next section.
Empirical Analyses and Results
In this section we present the results of our empirical analyses. First, we compare leverage and various aspects of capital structure choices between dual-class and the matched sample of single-class 10 We also repeat our analyses by using the Gaussian and Epanechnikov estimators, which employ a weighted average of the single-class firm-years, with more weight given to single-class firm-years with propensity scores that are closer to the propensity scores of the dual-class firm-years. The Gaussian estimator uses all single-class firmyears, while for the Epanechnikov estimator we specify a propensity bandwidth (h) that limits the sample of singleclass firm-years to be used for comparison. Following Bharath et al. [2009] , we specify h = 0.01. Our results are robust to using these additional matching algorithms as well.
firms. Second, we analyze the effect of leverage on the relation between dual-class ownership and firm value. 
Dual-Class Firms and Capital Structure Choices
Leverage and Private Debt
for LEV_MKT).
The t-statistics for the differences in book and market leverage, while reduced, are 2.56 and 2.88 respectively, which are statistically significant at the 5% level. The above results are consistent with the bonding argument (H1), i.e., ceteris paribus, one mechanism through which managers commit to not expropriate non-controlling shareholders is through the issuance of more debt.
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We proceed with testing H2, which predicts that dual class companies more frequently rely on private debt. PVT_DEBT is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm has at least one active bank loan outstanding during the year. We find that dual-class firms are significantly more likely than single-class firms to have at least one bank loan over the sample period. 
Relationship Lending
Our relationship lending measures are computed based on prior research. As in Bharath et al.
[ Additionally, we examine the existence and the number of loan renegotiations as further evidence of repeated interactions between a borrower and a lender. Specifically, AMENDS is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a loan has at least one amendment on Dealscan, and #COV_AMENDS is the number of amendments made to a particular loan. While the differences in these two variables are not significant between the dual-class and single-class firms in the unmatched sample, these differences are statistically significant between the dual-class and single-class firms in our matched sample. The average value for AMENDS is 0.16 for dual-class firms and 0.12 for single-class firms (t-statistic = 2.69), and the average #COV_AMENDS for dual-class firms is 1.19 as compared to 1.13 for single-class firms (t-statistic = 2.63).
These results imply that lenders are more likely to amend contracts (e.g., renegotiate covenants) for dualclass as compared to single-class firms, indicating repeated interaction with dual-class firms and more active monitoring by the lenders.
Covenants
We next examine differences in negative and financial covenants between dual-class and singleclass firms. We consider the presence of the following negative covenants measured using dummy variables: restrictions on debt issues (DEBT_ISSUE), restrictions on asset sales (ASSET_SALE), restrictions on equity issues (EQUITY_ISSUE), restrictions on insurance proceeds (INS_PROCEEDS), and restrictions on distribution of excess cash flows (EXCESS_CF). These covenants require part or all the cash flows from debt issues, asset sales, equity issues, insurance proceeds and excess cash flows to be used in reducing the firm's indebtedness. We also consider a total count of these restrictions (SWEEPS) separately.
Our results support the predictions of H4 ( We measure financial covenants using three variables. We compute the number of financial covenants at the package level (FIN_COV). To probe deeper into firms' choices of financial covenants,
we follow Christensen and Nikolaev [2010] to further break the financial covenants into two broad categories: (1) the number of capital covenants (CAP_COV), which rely on information about sources and uses of capital (i.e., balance sheet information only), and typically specify the level of equity or debt capital in the capital structure; (2) the number of performance covenants (PERF_COV), which is based on income statement information and control future renegotiations.
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Our results, presented in Panel B of Table 5 , are consistent with our predictions in H5. The comparison before matching indicates that dual-class firms have 2.51 financial covenants as compared with 2.29 covenants in single class firms (t-statistic = 4.89), and 1.89 performance covenants as compared with 1.45 performance covenants in single class firms (t-statistic = 9.56). When we control for the contracting environment and examine the matched sample, we find that dual-class companies have 2.59
(1.91) financial (performance) covenants as compared to the 2.32 (1.66) such covenants in the matched sample of single-class companies, with the differences being statistically significant (t-statistic for the difference in financial (performance) covenants being 3.03 (2.99)). While the number of capital 13 The covenant benchmarks for CAP_COV include: (1) Quick ratio; (2) Current ratio; (3) Debt-to-equity ratio; (4) Loan-to-value ratio; (5) Debt-to-tangible-net-worth ratio; (6) Leverage ratio; and (7) Senior leverage ratio. The covenant benchmarks for PERF_COV include: (1) Cash interest coverage ratio; (2) Debt service coverage ratio; (3) Level of EBITDA; (4) Fixed charge coverage ratio; (5) Interest coverage ratio; (6) Debt to EBITDA; and (7) Senior debt to EBITDA.
covenants is significantly lower in dual-class firms before matching, the difference becomes insignificant once we perform the test using the matched sample of single-class firms.
Performance Pricing
Our final analysis considers the difference in performance pricing provisions between dual-and single-class firms. Our first measure is a dummy variable which equals to 1 when performance pricing is available for a loan (PERF_PRICING). Further, given that pricing grids are formulated in terms of either accounting information or credit ratings, we develop measures according to these categories (Asquith et al. [2005] ). First, we employ an indicator for rating-based loan pricing grids, formulated in terms of commercial paper rating, subordinated debt rating, or senior debt rating (PERF_RATING). Next, for the grids formulated in terms of accounting information, we use indicators for profitability-based (PERF_P) and capital-based loan pricing grids (PERF_C). In line with our predictions, we do not find significant differences in the use of capital-based performance grids. Finally, PERF_RATING is not significantly different across the dual-class and single-class sample (both for the before-match and matched samples). Therefore, the loan contacts of the dual-class firms appear to rely more on profitability-based loan pricing grids that allocate the bargaining power to lenders in periods of underperformance.
Overall, our evidence on leverage, private debt, and various detailed contractual features of bank loans indicates that dual-class firms opt for greater scrutiny by lenders as compared to a matched sample of single-class firms. Our findings are consistent with the notion that debt serves as a bonding mechanism through which insiders in dual-class companies pre-commit not to expropriate value from minority shareholders. Further, these results support the theory that accounting information in debt contracts can play an important role in reducing agency conflicts, particularly in the setting of dual class firms (Watts and Zimmerman [1978; 1986; 1990] ).
Finally, we report comparisons of several other loan characteristics between dual-and singleclass firms for the sake of completeness (results are reported in Table 7 ). We find that, as compared to the matched single-class firms, dual-class firms have more long term debt and loans with longer maturities. This result is expected because financial covenants are typically beneficial in combination with debt of longer maturity (Rajan and Winton [1995] ). However, we do not observe any significant differences between dual-and the matched single-class firms for other loan characteristics, namely, credit spread, deal amount, secured debt, senior debt, revolver loans, and number of lenders in the syndicate.
Dual-Class Ownership Structure and Firm Value
To corroborate our inferences on the bonding hypothesis, we examine whether dual-class firms with higher levels of debt obtain more favorable capital market outcomes. Specifically, as in other studies, we study the implications of debt levels for firm value, as proxied by Tobin's q. We follow the PSM methodology as in the previous section, and first estimate the following logistic regression 15 :
(2) 15 We repeat the logistic regression using only the control variables used in Gompers et al. (2009) , and our results are robust to using their controls. However, we include additional controls (such as SG&A and ALTMAN_ZSCORE) in our model to better capture the contracting environment of firms.
Based on the predicted probability from this model, we match each dual-class firm-year observation with a set of single-class firm-year observations and use the Nearest Neighbor estimator.
Panel A of Table 8 presents the results of the propensity score regression, which are similar to those reported in the earlier section. As before, we verify the absence of covariate imbalance between the matched pairs by testing for significant difference between treatment and control group on the matching dimensions.
As a second step, in order to examine the effect of leverage on firm value we estimate the following regression on the matched sample of dual class and single class firms:
In the above equation, Tobin's q is measured as the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Alternatively, we measure Tobin's q as the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity, or market-to-book (observations with negative book values of equity are excluded from the analysis). H7 predicts a positive sign on the interaction between leverage and the dual-class dummy (β 3 ). . Table 8 presents the results. The regression results are generally similar for book leverage and market leverage, and we only discuss the results corresponding to book leverage (however, we present both sets of results in the table and point out differences, if any). The coefficient on the DUAL dummy is significantly negative for LEV_BK when market-to-book is the dependent variable. This is consistent with the evidence in Gompers et al. [2009] that dual-class firms have lower valuations on average. However, while negative, the coefficients for DUAL are not statistically significant in other cases. More importantly, we find that the interaction terms DUAL×LEVERAGE are significantly positive in all regressions, suggesting that the negative effect of dual-class ownership on Tobin's q and market-tobook is attenuated by a dual-class firm's level of leverage. In fact, for sufficiently high leverage the relationship between firm value and dual-class ownership becomes positive, consistent with the bonding role of debt in dual-class firms. 16 This result extends the evidence in Gompers et al. [2009] , suggesting that debt performs an important governance role in dual-class firms.
Panel B of
Endogeneity
Empirical research on dual-class firms is subject to the potential endogeneity problem which may confound the interpretation of any results. We recognize that there are differences in the contracting environments of dual-versus single-class firms, and that these differences are likely to be related to the capital structure decisions in these firms. We, therefore, use propensity score matching to control for a comprehensive set of observable attributes that characterize contracting environment and investment opportunities of dual-and single-class firms. In addition, we include in the regressions time dummies to control for general changes in market conditions and industry dummies to account for variation in ownership structures across industries (Cronqvist and Nilsson [2003] ). 17 While the use of propensity score matching mitigates the endogeneity concern, it is plausible that our matching algorithm cannot control for certain unobservable factors, and these can affect the inferences of the paper. We discuss below some potential concerns, and how we attempt to control for them.
First, we address the concern of reverse causation, that is, whether financing choices drive the choice of dual-class structure. We note that most firms in our sample have had dual-class structures in place since their IPOs, and that these structures have undergone little variation over time. 18 Thus, the reverse causation argument is less likely to be an issue in our setting. Nevertheless, to further address the reverse causation argument, we replace our leverage variables with debt issues made by firms subsequent to their IPOs, and obtain qualitatively similar results.
16 Note that while we are interpreting Tobin's q as a valuation measure for assets in place, the numerator of Tobin's q likely reflects the capitalized value of growth options. Thus, even though we run this analysis in a matched sample, as in Gompers et al. [2009] , we repeat the regression by controlling for these options by including the ratio of R&D to sales, the ratio of capital expenditures to assets, and the ratio of advertising to sales. Our main results are unchanged, and these controls are insignificant as expected. 17 Due to the lack of within-firm variation in the dual-class sample, we cannot include firm fixed effects in our regressions. 18 All but 159 sample firms had dual-class ownership over the entire sample period. Eliminating the 159 firms that had dual-class unifications over the sample period does not materially alter our results.
Second, we acknowledge that our matching algorithm cannot control for unobservable factors such as management types. It is plausible that family firms that opt for dual-class structures, on average, have different control preferences than those that do not opt for these structures. Recall that we have controlled for family firms in the propensity score model, as founders in family firms are likely to have stronger needs to retain control. We also note that the need for control is likely to be correlated with the motives of management -either to enhance shareholder value through their leadership or to entrench themselves and enjoy private benefits at the expense of shareholders. These motives will also manifest through other decisions taken by management -such as capital structure choices. Therefore, to the extent that these differences in unobservable management motives are correlated with their actions, omitting this dimension in our matching algorithm helps us to capture the bonding choices made by management.
Finally, we recognize that differences in management quality may affect both the choice of dualclass shares and capital structure choices for reasons other than pure control motives of management.
Incompetent managers realizing their own ineptitude may choose to hold more dual-class shares to maintain their control over their companies and retain fewer cash flow rights to limit their losses from their poor decisions (Masulis et al. [2009] ). Following Morck et al. [1990] and Masulis et al. [2009] , we repeat the PSM matching by including industry-adjusted operating performance over the previous 3 years as a measure of management quality, and obtain similar results.
Conclusion
In this paper we investigate whether the existence of dual-class ownership structures is related to these firms' capital structure decisions. In particular, we explore whether insiders in dual-class firms use debt as a mechanism that commits them to exert effort and not to expropriate non-controlling shareholders. In support of this bonding hypothesis, we find that in comparison to a propensity-matched sample of single-class firms, dual-class firms are associated with higher book and market leverage.
Additionally, we find that compared to single-class firms, dual-class firms have a greater tendency to issue private loans, are more likely to borrow from relationship lenders, rely more extensively on negative and financial covenants, and are more likely to have loan credit agreements with accounting-based performance pricing provisions. Taken together, the various capital structure decisions made by insiders in dual-class companies support the hypothesis that debt serves as a commitment mechanism. This inference is reinforced by evidence that the negative relation between dual-class ownership and Tobin's q is attenuated by the effect of leverage.
This study contributes to the literature on disproportional control by providing evidence that insiders in dual-class firms employ debt financing as a commitment device to bond against the agency conflicts arising from the dual-class ownership structure. As a result, dual-class firms with more outstanding debt obtain more favorable capital market outcomes. More generally, our findings suggest that the dual-class ownership structure can be optimal when alternative control mechanisms are used to mitigate agency conflicts associated with dual-class ownership. Further research would further enhance our understanding of the cross-sectional variation and valuation implications of disproportional control structures.
APPENDIX I: VARIABLES Category Variable (Name) Measurement
Firm Variables
Existence of dual-class stock in a firm. (DUAL)
A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has a dual-class stock ownership structure, and 0 otherwise.
Firm size. (SIZE)
The natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm, which is the product of the number of shares outstanding and the year's closing price per share.
Growth opportunities. (BTM)
The book value of equity divided by the market value of equity.
Dividend yield. (DIV)
The ratio of common dividends declared divided by market capitalization.
Operating performance of the firm.
(ROA)
Operating income before depreciation divided by the firm's average total assets, adjusted for the industry as measured by the two-digit SIC code.
Tangible assets in the firm.
(TANGIBILITY)
The ratio of total net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets.
Asset uniqueness. (SG&A)
The ratio of selling, general, and administrative expenses divided by total assets.
Asset uniqueness. (R&D)
The ratio of research and development expenses divided by total assets. This variable is set equal to 0 when advertising is missing.
Capital expenditures. (CAPEX)
The ratio of capital expenditures divided by total assets.
Growth in revenues. (REV_GROWTH)
The ratio of current year revenues to revenue in the prior year.
Advertising expenditures. (ADV)
The ratio of advertising to total assets. This variable is set equal to 0 when advertising is missing. 
APPENDIX I: VARIABLES (Cont.)
Firm Variables S&P index membership.
(S&P500)
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in the S&P 500 index and 0 otherwise.
Firm value. (TOBIN'S_Q)
The ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets, where the market value of assets is calculated as the book value of assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity.
Market-to-book. (MTB)
Market value of equity divided by book value of equity.
Leverage
Book leverage. (LEV_BK)
The total liabilities divided by the book value of assets.
Variables
Market leverage. (LEV_MKT)
The total liabilities divided by the market value of equity plus book value of liabilities.
Private debt. (PVT_DEBT)
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has at least one active bank loan outstanding, and 0 otherwise.
Relationship lending. (REL_BANK)
A dummy variable that equals 1 if there was prior lending by the same lender in the past, and 0 otherwise.
Relationship strength based on the amount of loans.
(REL_AMOUNT)
The dollar amount of loans by a lender in the past 5 years divided by the total amount of loans by the borrower in the past 5 years.
Relationship strength based on the number of loans.
(REL_NUMBER)
The number of loans by a lender in the past 5 years divided by the total number of loans by the borrower in the past 5 years.
Loan amendments. (AMENDS)
A dummy variable that equals 1 if a loan has at least one amendment on Dealscan before it matures, and 0 otherwise.
Number of covenant amendments. (#COV_AMENDS)
The number of amendments to a particular loan that involve changes to financial or negative covenants.
Covenants on debt issues.
A dummy variable that equals 1 when restrictions on debt issues are included, and 0 otherwise.
Covenants on asset sales.
A dummy variable that equals 1 when restrictions on asset sales are included, and 0 otherwise.
Covenants on equity issues.
A dummy variable that equals 1 when restrictions on equity issues are included, and 0 otherwise.
Covenants on insurance proceeds.
A dummy variable that equals 1 when restrictions on insurance proceeds are included, and 0 otherwise.
Covenants on distribution of excess cash flows. (EXCESS_CF)
A dummy variable that equals 1 when restrictions on distribution of excess cash flows are included, and 0 otherwise.
APPENDIX I: VARIABLES (Cont.)
Leverage Variables
Covenants with sweeps.
(SWEEPS)
A count of sweep-type of covenants out of the following types:
Asset sales sweep, debt issuance sweep, equity issuance sweep, insurance proceeds sweep and excess cash flow sweep. Sweeps require part or all of the cash flow from these activities to be used in reducing the amount of indebtedness.
Financial covenants. (FIN_COV)
The number of financial covenants at the package level.
Capital-based financial covenants.
(CAP_COV)
The number of capital based covenants, where the covenant benchmarks include: (1) Quick ratio; (2) Current ratio; (3) Debt-toequity ratio; (4) Loan-to-value ratio; (5) Debt-to-tangible-net-worth ratio; (6) Leverage ratio; and (7) leverage, debt to tangible net worth ratio, and senior debt leverage ratio.
Performance pricing based on ratings. (PERF_RATING)
A count of rating-based loan pricing grids. The types of rating-based grids include grids are formulated in terms of commercial paper rating, subordinated debt rating, and senior debt rating.
Long-term debt. (LT_DEBT)
The total long-term debt divided by total liabilities.
Loan maturity. (MATURITY)
The logarithm of the loan maturity of the facility (in months).
Cost of debt. (AISD)
The "All-in-Spread-Drawn" measured as the coupon spread over LIBOR on the drawn amount (including the annual fee).
Deal amount. (DEAL_AMT)
The natural logarithm of total deal amount (all facilitates included).
Leverage Variables
Secured debt. (SECURED)
A dummy variable that equals 1 if debt is secured, and 0 otherwise.
Senior debt. (SENIOR)
A dummy variable that equals 1 if senior debt is present, and 0 otherwise.
Revolving loans. (REVOLVER)
A dummy variable that equals 1 if a revolving facility exists in the deal package, and 0 otherwise.
Number of lenders. (#BANKS)
The natural logarithm of the number of lenders in the syndicate. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the full sample of dual and single class firms and the logistic regression for propensity-score matching technique. The variables are defined as follows. DUAL is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a dual class stock ownership structure, and 0 otherwise; SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalization; BTM is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity; DIV is the ratio of the common dividends declared divided by the market capitalization; ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided by the firm's average total assets, adjusted for the industry as measured by the two-digit SIC code; TANGIBILITY is the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets; SG&A is the ratio of selling, general, and administrative expenses to total assets; CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets; REV_GROWTH is the ratio of current year revenues to prior year revenues; ADV is the ratio of advertising to total assets in the prior fiscal year;
R&D is the ratio of research and development expenditures to total assets; STD_RET is the variance of monthly stock returns over the prior year; BETA is the security beta calculated each year based on the correlation of daily stock returns with daily returns on equally weighted market index; FIRM_AGE is the number of years since the year the firm first appeared on Compustat; #SEGMENTS is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm has more than one Compustat business segment during the year; FAMILY is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is a family firm, and 0 otherwise; MEDIA is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in the Media industry and 0 otherwise; ALTMAN_ZSCORE is the probability of bankruptcy measured using the bankruptcy prediction model in Hillegiest, Keating, Cram and Lundstedt (2004) . Table 1 , panel A compares the summary statistics for the samples of dual class firms and the single class firms. The variables are defined as follows. SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalization; BTM is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity; DIV is the ratio of the common dividends declared divided by the market capitalization; ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided by the firm's average total assets, adjusted for the industry as measured by the two-digit SIC code; TANGIBILITY is the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets; SG&A is the ratio of selling, general, and administrative expenses to total assets; CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets; REV_GROWTH is the ratio of current year revenues to prior year revenues; ADV is the ratio of advertising to total assets in the prior fiscal year; R&D is the ratio of research and development expenditures to total assets; STD_RET is the variance of monthly stock returns over the prior year; BETA is the security beta calculated each year based on the correlation of daily stock returns with daily returns on equally weighted market index; FIRM_AGE is the number of years since the year the firm first appeared on Compustat; #SEGMENTS is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm has more than one Compustat business segment during the year; FAMILY is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is a family firm, and 0 otherwise; MEDIA is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in the Media industry and 0 otherwise; ALTMAN_ZSCORE is the probability of bankruptcy measured using the bankruptcy prediction model in Hillegiest, Keating, Cram and Lundstedt (2004) . McFadden's Pseudo R-square 10.04% Chi-Square (P > Chi-Square) 1504.56 (0.000) ***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the full sample of dual and single class firms and the logistic regression for propensity-score matching technique. The variables are defined as follows. DUAL is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a dual class stock ownership structure, and 0 otherwise; SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalization; BTM is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity; DIV is the ratio of the common dividends declared divided by the market capitalization; ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided by the firm's average total assets, adjusted for the industry as measured by the two-digit SIC code; TANGIBILITY is the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets; SG&A is the ratio of selling, general, and administrative expenses to total assets; CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets; REV_GROWTH is the ratio of current year revenues to prior year revenues; ADV is the ratio of advertising to total assets in the prior fiscal year; R&D is the ratio of research and development expenditures to total assets; STD_RET is the variance of monthly stock returns over the prior year; BETA is the security beta calculated each year based on the correlation of daily stock returns with daily returns on equally weighted market index; FIRM_AGE is the number of years since the year the firm first appeared on Compustat; #SEGMENTS is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm has more than one Compustat business segment during the year; FAMILY is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is a family firm, and 0 otherwise; MEDIA is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in the Media industry and 0 otherwise; ALTMAN_ZSCORE is the probability of bankruptcy measured using the bankruptcy prediction model in Hillegiest, Keating, Cram and Lundstedt (2004) . Table 1 presents summary statistics for the full sample of dual and single class firms and the logistic regression for propensity-score matching technique. The variables are defined as follows. DUAL is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a dual class stock ownership structure, and 0 otherwise; SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalization; BTM is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity; DIV is the ratio of the common dividends declared divided by the market capitalization; ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided by the firm's average total assets, adjusted for the industry as measured by the two-digit SIC code; TANGIBILITY is the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets; SG&A is the ratio of selling, general, and administrative expenses to total assets; CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets; REV_GROWTH is the ratio of current year revenues to prior year revenues; ADV is the ratio of advertising to total assets in the prior fiscal year;
R&D is the ratio of research and development expenditures to total assets; STD_RET is the variance of monthly stock returns over the prior year; BETA is the security beta calculated each year based on the correlation of daily stock returns with daily returns on equally weighted market index; FIRM_AGE is the number of years since the year the firm first appeared on Compustat; #SEGMENTS is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm has more than one Compustat business segment during the year; FAMILY is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is a family firm, and 0 otherwise; MEDIA is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in the Media industry and 0 otherwise; ALTMAN_ZSCORE is the probability of bankruptcy measured using the bankruptcy prediction model in Hillegiest, Keating, Cram and Lundstedt (2004) . Non-missing data requirements limit the pre-matched sample consists of 9,225 observations of which 2,039 are treated. Table 3 presents the results for the differences in leverage and private debt for dual-class firms versus both the unmatched and the propensity matched sample of single-class firms. LEV_BK is the total debt held by the firm divided by the book value of assets of the firm; LEV_MKT is the total debt held by the firm divided by the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities; PVT_DEBT is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a bank loan contract that year, and 0 otherwise. Non-missing data requirements limit the pre-matched sample consists of 9,225. Table 6 presents the results for the differences in relationship lending and covenant amendments for dual-class firms versus both the unmatched and the propensity matched sample of single-class firms. REL_BANK is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there was prior lending by the same lender in the past, and 0 otherwise; REL_AMOUNT is the dollar amount of loans by a lender in the past 5 years divided by the total amount of loans by the borrower in the past 5 years; REL_NUMBER is the number of loans by a lender in the past 5 years divided by the total number of loans by the borrower in the past 5 years; AMENDS is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the loan has at least one amendment on Dealscan before it matures; #COV_AMENDS is the number of amendments to a particular loan that involves changes to financial or negative covenants. Data requirement limit the pre-matched sample consists of 9,225 observations. Table 4 , panel A presents the results for the differences in various negative covenants for dual-class firms versus both the unmatched and the propensity matched sample of single-class firms. DEBT_ISSUE is a dummy variable that equals 1 when restrictions on debt issues are included, and 0 otherwise; ASSET_SALE is a dummy variable that equals 1 when restrictions on asset sales are included, and 0 otherwise; EQUITY_ISSUE dummy variable that equals 1 when restrictions on equity issues are included, and 0 otherwise; INS_PROCEEDS is a dummy variable that equals 1 when restrictions on insurance proceeds are included, and 0 otherwise; EXCESS_CF is a dummy variable that equals 1 when restrictions on distributions of excess cash flows are included, and 0 otherwise; SWEEPS is a count of sweep-type of covenants out of the following types: asset sales sweep, debt issuance sweep, equity issuance sweep, insurance proceeds sweep and excess cash flow sweep. Non-missing data requirements limit the pre-matched sample consists of 9,225 observations of which 750 are treated. Table 4 , panel B presents the results for the differences in number and types of financial covenants for dual-class firms versus both the unmatched and the propensity matched sample of single-class firms. FIN_COV is the number of financial covenants at the package level; CAP_COV is the number of capital based covenants, where the covenant benchmarks include: (1) Quick ratio, (2) Current ratio, (3) Debt-to-equity ratio, (4) Loan-to-value ratio, (5) Debt-to-tangible-net-worth ratio, (6) Leverage ratio and (7) Senior leverage ratio; PERF_COV is the number of capital based covenants, where the covenant benchmarks include: (1) Cash interest coverage ratio, (2) Debt service coverage ratio, (3) Level of EBITDA, (4) Fixed charge coverage ratio, (5) Interest coverage ratio, (6) Debt to EBITDA and (7) Senior debt to EBITDA. Non-missing data requirements limit the pre-matched sample consists of 4,639 observations of which 380 are treated. ***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level. T-statistics are based on bootstrapped standard errors. Table 5 presents the results for the differences in performance pricing in loan contracts for dual-class firms versus both the unmatched and the propensity matched sample of single-class firms. PERF_PRICING is a dummy variable that equals 1 if performance pricing is available for the loan, and 0 otherwise; PERF_P is a count of loan pricing grids based on performance (profitability) indicators, where the list of performance indicators include: debt service coverage ratio, fixed charge coverage ratio, interest coverage ratio, senior debt to cash flow (EBITDA) ratio, and total debt to cash flow (EBITDA) ratio; PERF_C is a count of loan pricing indicators formulated in terms of capital-ratio based indicators, where the list of capital indicators includes: leverage, debt to tangible net worth ratio, and senior debt leverage ratio; PERF_RATING is a count of rating-based loan pricing grids, where the types of rating-based grids include grids are formulated in terms of commercial paper rating, subordinated debt rating, and senior debt rating. Nonmissing data requirements limit the pre-matched sample consists of 9,225 observations of which 750 are treated. Table 7 presents the results for differences in various other debt contract characteristics for dual-class firms versus both the unmatched and the propensity matched sample of singleclass firms. LT_DEBT is the ratio of long-term debt over total liabilities; MATURITY is the logarithm of the maturity of the facility measured in months; AISD is the All in Spread Drawn measured as the coupon spread over LIBOR on the drawn amount, including the annual fee; DEAL_AMT is the natural logarithm of total deal amount, including all facilities; SECURED is a dummy variable that equals 1 if debt is secured, and 0 otherwise; SENIOR is a dummy variable that equals 1 if senior debt is present, and 0 otherwise; REVOLVER is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a revolving facility exists in the deal package, and 0 otherwise; #BANKS is the natural logarithm of the number of lenders in the syndicate. Nonmissing data requirements limit the pre-matched sample consists of 6,446 observations of which 567 are treated. McFadden's Pseudo R-square 9.59% Chi-Square (P> Chi-Square) 1377.18 (0.0000) ***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level. Table 9 , panel A presents the logistic regression for propensity-score matching technique for examining differences in performance outcomes between dual class and single class firms. The variables are defined as follows. SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalization; BTM is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity; DIV is the ratio of the common dividends declared divided by the market capitalization; ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided by the firm's average total assets, adjusted for the industry as measured by the two-digit SIC code; TANGIBILITY is the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets; CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets;
REV_GROWTH is the ratio of current year revenues to prior year revenues; ADV is the ratio of advertising to total assets in the prior fiscal year; R&D is the ratio of research and development expenditures to total assets; FIRM_AGE is the number of years since the year the firm first appeared on Compustat; #SEGMENTS is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm has more than one Compustat business segment during the year; FAMILY is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is a family firm, and 0 otherwise; MEDIA is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in the Media industry and 0 otherwise. ***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level. T-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. Table 8 , Panel B presents the results of the linear regression of the effect of leverage on firm value in dualclass firms versus a propensity matched sample of single-class firms. The dependent variable is the value of the firm as proxied by market-to-book (MTB) and Tobin's q (TOBIN'S_Q). The variables are defined as follows: MTB is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity; TOBIN'S_Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets; DUAL is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has dualclass stock, and 0 otherwise; LEVERAGE is either book leverage (LEV_BK), defined as the ratio of total debt to the book value of equity, or market leverage (LEV_MKT), defined as the ratio of total debt to the market value of equity for the year.
